A walk down corpus delicti lane

The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently issued a published opinion in a DUI case about corpus delicti. Anderson v. State, Op. No. 6051 (S.C. Ct. App. Filed February 21, 2024) (Howard Adv. Sh. No. 7 at 19).

Most lawyers are familiar with the phrase, which translates as “body of the crime” and represents the principle that a person should not be convicted of a crime without sufficient proof that the alleged crime happened. More concretely, the concept of corpus delicti means that a confession to a crime alone is not enough to convict a person – there must be other independent evidence that the crime to which the person confessed has actually occurred. This concept seems quite obvious but there is of course great debate about what constitutes sufficient proof in various contexts. As it turns out, the corpus delicti in a murder case does not necessarily include the body of the deceased person – for good reasons I might add. State v. Owens, 293 S.C. 161, 359 S.E.2d 275 (1987).

In Anderson, police responded to a “suspicious vehicle in a driveway” of a private residence. Upon arrival, they discovered Anderson “passed out in the driver’s seat with his foot on the brake, while the vehicle’s engine was running with the transmission in drive.” The private residence was not Anderson’s. Anderson at 20. Anderson admitted to the officers that he had been driving and that he was drunk. Id. Now, the reader could be forgiven for thinking it pretty obvious that Anderson had been driving even if he had not admitted to it. But lawyers have a way of making the simple seem complex.

At his trial in magistrates court, Anderson moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the State failed to prove that Anderson was driving. Anderson relied on State v. Graves, 269 S.C. 356, 237 S.E.2d 584 (1977) and argued that driving required movement of the vehicle and that his confession to driving was not enough to prove the corpus delicti. The State pointed out that Anderson was asleep in a vehicle that was stopped in a driveway that was not his while the engine was running and the car was in drive. The magistrate denied Anderson’s motion for a directed verdict. But on appeal to the circuit court, Anderson prevailed. The circuit court reversed Anderson’s conviction, finding that this was not sufficient independent evidence that Anderson was driving the vehicle. Anderson at 21-22.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the State had produced sufficient corroborating evidence that Anderson was driving the vehicle. In doing so, the Court acknowledged the striking similarities between the facts of Anderson’s case and the facts in Graves where the South Carolina Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion. The case then presents an interesting springboard to look at what the current state of the law is in South Carolina regarding the corpus delicti of DUI.

In Graves, a law enforcement officer found a “1972 Pontiac, with the engine running and the transmission in gear, occupied by [Graves] who was leaning over the steering wheel asleep.” Graves at 359. Sounds a lot like our friend Anderson. The Graves Court went on a lengthy exposé about the difference between the words “driving” and “operating” as used in various South Carolina statutes. The Court found that “‘drive’… usually denotes movement of the vehicle in some direction, whereas the word ‘operate’ has a broader meaning.” Graves at 361. 

The DUI statute in South Carolina prohibits “driving” under the influence. It does not prohibit “operating” a vehicle while under the influence. S.C. Code §56-5-2930. The Graves Court then held that the word “drive” requires the vehicle to be in motion. Graves was a 3-2 split decision though with the dissent arguing that the words “driving” and “operating” are used interchangeably in the statues and viewed the majority as abandoning “the common sense interpretation of the two terms.” Graves at 366 (Ness, J. dissenting). But, the majority held that the corpus delicti of a DUI consists of "driving," and not "operating."

It is no wonder that Anderson pointed the court to the Graves decision as compelling authority as to why the State had failed to prove the corpus delicti at his DUI trial. So why did the Court of Appeals reach the opposite conclusion here? The answer is because there has been a long line of cases post-Graves that seem to have shifted the law in this area.

Enter State v. Osborne, 335 S.C. 172, 516 S.E.2d 201 (1999), a South Carolina Supreme Court case that “clarified” the law regarding corpus delicti. In Osborne, a law enforcement officer arrived on the scene of a one-car accident with no driver present. Roughly two hours later, Osborne was found drunk at a convenience store and had reported his vehicle as stolen. Osborne was advised of his Miranda rights and then admitted to driving and wrecking his car. Id. at 174.

The court in Osborne held that, “the corroboration rule is satisfied if the State provides sufficient independent evidence which serves to corroborate the defendant’s extra-judicial statements and, together with such statements, permits a reasonable belief that the crime occurred.” Id. at 179. The Court came to this conclusion by relying on, and adopting, a rule regarding corpus delicti from Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954). Opper was not a DUI case, but rather a case about a private citizen bribing a government employee to recommend a certain type of ski goggles to be used in Air Force survival kits.

Note the dates of these cases. Opper was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1954. More than twenty years before the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Graves. The Graves opinion makes no mention whatsoever of the Opper case. But more than twenty years after Graves was decided, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Opper corroboration rule in Osborne. And as the Court of Appeals recent opinion in Anderson points out, there have been numerous cases since Osborne that have reaffirmed South Carolina’s adherence to the corroboration rule set forth in Opper. South Carolina has also repeatedly applied that rule in the context of DUI cases. See Hill v. State, 415 S.C. 421, 782 S.E.2d (Ct. App. 2016); State v. Abraham, 408 S.C. 589, 759 S.E.2d 440 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Russell, 345 S.C. 128, 546 S.E.2d 202 (Ct. App. 2001).

Interestingly, none of the DUI corpus delicti cases after Graves have even mentioned the Graves case at all. Yet all of them cite to and rely on Opper, a case that predated Graves by more than twenty years. Another point worth noting is that the Supreme Court in Graves invited the South Carolina General Assembly to amend the DUI statute to include the word “operating” which would have altered the corpus delicti for DUI to bring Graves’ conduct within the purview of the statute. Graves at 365. The General Assembly has chosen not to amend the body of the statute to include “operating,” but the title of the DUI statute uses the word “operating,” and not “driving.” S.C. Code § 56-5-2930.

So it’s almost as if the Graves case never happened. The primary, and maybe only, distinguishing fact in these cases is that Graves did not admit to driving, while the defendants in the other cases did. If Anderson had not admitted to driving, would the Court of Appeals have reached the opposite conclusion? And how will our appellate courts deal with the apparent inconsistency between “operating” and “driving.” I’ve already noted the dissent in Graves made the point that these words should be treated as the same thing, and the statute now uses both of the words, albeit in different places. Furthermore, several published opinions in South Carolina have appeared to suggest that “operating” and “driving” are synonymous in the DUI context. See State v. Salisbury, 343 S.C. 520, 541 S.E.2d 247 (2001); State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 498 S.E.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Martin, 275 S.C. 141, 268 S.E.2d 105 (1980).

Has Graves been effectively overruled by now? Or did the Court of Appeals in its recent decision in Anderson reach the right result for the wrong reason, or the wrong result for the right reason? It’s about as clear as mud!

adam@ruffinappeals.com

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